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CVC中基于信任水平和技术价值的投资对象选择博弈分析 被引量:4

The Game Analysis of Selecting Investment Object on the Level of Trust and Technology Value in CVC
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摘要 在企业创业投资中,创投企业与新创企业间的信任水平对影响创投企业选择投资对象有重要影响。基于信任水平对创投双方行为和收益的影响,本文从创投企业视角出发,界定信任水平概念,构建基于信任水平和新企业技术价值的投资对象选择动态分析模型,研究信任水平和技术价值对投资对象选择的影响。结果表明:当创投企业与新创企业信任水平较低,其投资决策依赖于新创企业技术价值;而当创投市场中存在一部分新创企业与创投企业信任水平较高时,其投资决策依赖于技术价值和信任水平的综合考虑。 In corporate venture capital, the level of trust between venture capitals and start-up entrepreneurs has important effect on selecting new ventures to invest. Based on the effect of trust on the behavior and profitability of the both, VCs trade-off the following factors, some of entrepreneurs have high value of technology than the others. However, the others anticipate a closer trusting relationship with the VC. Then we develop a dynamic analysis model that analyzes the effects of economic and behavioral characteristics on a VC' s choice of entrepreneur. The results show that when the level of trust between the both is low, the VC will just consider the value of technology to make his choice, while if some entrepreneurs enjoy the high trust level with the venture capital, which mitigates the double-sided shirking and expropriation threats, the VC will trade-off the value of technology and the level of trust.
出处 《预测》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期66-70,共5页 Forecasting
基金 教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(13YJA630058) 重庆市软科学研究计划资助项目(cstc2012cx-rkx A0047)
关键词 企业创业投资 新创企业 信任水平 技术价值 博弈分析 corporate venture capital new venture level of trust value of technology game theory analysis
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参考文献14

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