政治关联、产权性质与掏空——来自沪市A股制造业的经验证据

Political Connections, Property Rights and Tunneling: Empirical Evidence From China's SH A-share Listed Companies in Manufacturing

使用2008-2011年沪市A股制造业的数据，本文首次发现了政治关联对控股股东掏空行为存在“监督效应”，即政治关联高管会显著约束其控股股东的资金侵占行为（掏空）；在进一步的产权性质对比研究后发现，政治关联高管对于控股股东掏空的“监督效应”在国有企业中表现的更为显著。此外，政治关联对掏空行为的“监督效应”随着市场化程度的提高而减弱，表明政府力量与市场力量之间存在着“此消彼长”的关系。本文通过一系列的实证研究和稳健性检验，从一个侧面证实了政治关联的“效率观”。

Using the data of China's SH A-share Listed companies in manufacturing from 2008 to 2011, this article finds that political connections have supervision effect on tunneling. Namely, tunneling will be significantly constrained by political connections. After further comparative study based on property rights, it finds that the supervision effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises. Besides, supervision effect on tunneling of political connections is weakened with a higher level of market development, indicating that there is a "trade-off" between the government forces and market forces. By empirical research and robustness test, the article confirms the "Efficiency View" of political connections.