中国生态经济发展的双层次博弈模型——以企业为中心的群体内外博弈分析

A Double-level Game Model about Development of Ecological Economy in China——Game Analyses of Enterprise Group Inside-outside

可持续发展的生态经济之路已成为我国经济转型的基本方向,然而"外部性"和信息不对称影响的存在给生态经济的推行带来了困难。通过构筑政府与企业的混合策略博弈模型,得出纳什均衡点,进而将均衡点引入企业间博弈,从而搭建起生态经济发展的双层次博弈模型。分析表明:政府加大对企业的补贴、提高投机的惩罚力度,有利于鼓励企业实施生态经济生产模式,而生态经济模式的额外成本却阻碍生态经济的推行。同时,通过企业群体内博弈分析表明:公众监督奖惩机制会对博弈参数影响生态经济的推行造成干扰,在公众监督对企业的综合奖励影响高于惩罚时,关键参数对推进生态经济的实施具有正面作用,反之则起负面作用。

The way of ecological economy of sustainable development is the basic economic conversion trend in China, but externalities and information asymmetry influence the development of ecological economy. By constructing game theory of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the article concludes the equilibrium point. The article introduces the equilibrium point into the enterprise game model, and then constructs a double-level game model about development of ecological economy in China. It can encourage enterprises to implement production mode of ecological economy by raising governmental subsidies, enlarging punishment strength and reducing extra costs. By constructing enterprise group game model, it concludes that public supervising mechanism affects the functions of some parameters. When public reward is more than punishment, key parameters have a positive function for the implement of production mode of ecological economy, but a negative effect on the contrary.