摘要
地方政府与中央政府的不同利益诉求以及地方政府之间的竞争诱发并加剧了区域性的环境利益冲突。文章运用博弈论工具分析中央政府和地方政府以及地方政府之间在环境保护和经济发展中的博弈关系,通过构建数理模型描述各级政府的行为特征、利益取向以及由此引发的"公地悲剧"问题。最后,从地方政府政绩考评体系、环境保护绩效考评制度、"谁污染,谁治理"原则以及环境违规惩罚威慑力四个方面考察各级政府之间利益冲突的制度成因,并据此提出政策建议。
The different interests between the local government and the central government and the competition between local governments inducing and aggravating the regional environment interest conflicts. This paper uses game theory tool to analyze their game relationship between environmental protection and economic development,and describes the behavior characteristics and the interest orientation of the government at all levels,the resulting "tragedy of the Commons"problem by building the mathematical model. Finally,this article investigates the system cause of the interest conflict of the government at all levels from four aspects of the local government record evaluation system,environmental performance evaluation system,the principle of "who pollution,who governance"and environmental violations punishment deterrent,and provides suggestions.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期16-25,共10页
China Economic Studies
基金
国家社科重大攻关项目(12&ZD072))的资助
关键词
环境保护
经济增长
利益冲突
博弈
environmental protection
economic growth
interest conflict
game