侵占效率、理性防护边界与财产安全悖论——兼评房地产行业中的强拆现象

Predation Efficiency,Rational Defense Frontier and Property Rights Paradox

本文通过将财产安全性内生化,建立一个一般均衡模型来讨论经济主体在生产行为、保护个人财产行为和侵占他人财产行为之间的资源分配,并重点分析了司法体系对分配活动成本及经济总福利的影响。在理论上,本文证明了居民的产权安全性取决于外生的司法制度,而与其禀赋大小无关,并且企业侵占行为的有效性越强,居民的遏制性防护投入就越多。结合中国现实,本文还指出了一种均衡状态下的"财产安全悖论"——对于一个居民财产主要为土地的经济体系而言,如果开发商的侵占行为足够有效,那么居民的财产越安全,整个经济的总福利反而越低。解决这一财产安全悖论的根本途径则在于建立公正、高效的行政司法体系。

In this paper,we develop a general equilibrium model to analyze the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the effect of exogenous judicial system on property rights. We prove that the security of property right depends on the judicial system but independent of the size of endowment. The analysis also shows that the more effective of firm＇s offensive behavior,the more defensive resources allocated from the inhabitant. To accommodated with China＇s reality,we point out a property rights paradox in equilibrium state——for a society in which the major property is land,if the offensive behavior is effective enough,then the more effective predation is,the worse inhabitant＇s welfare and the more social welfare. The way to solve the paradox is to establish an impartial and effective judicial system.