管理层能力、权力与在职消费研究

Research on Managerial Ability, Power and Perks

近年来,媒体披露的上市公司天价业务招待费现象引起广泛关注。本文以2010-2012年沪深主板上市公司为样本,研究了管理层能力、管理层权力对在职消费的影响。研究发现,管理层能力与在职消费之间呈显著的负相关关系,能力较强的经理人较少地通过在职消费来攫取私人利益;管理层权力越大,其获取的在职消费水平越高,表明随着权力的增长,管理层有动机通过在职消费攫取私人利益;在民营上市公司中,能力较强的管理层更能约束其凭借权力增加在职消费的行为。完善公司内部治理机制和绩效评价机制,发挥内部代理人市场竞争和外部职业经理人市场竞争的甄别作用,以及新闻媒体的外部监督作用,有助于约束管理层滥用在职消费的行为。

Perks are non-monetary benefits, relevant or irrelevant to duties, acquired by managers in performing their duties. According to principal-agent theory, if the residual claims of a company separated with its ultimate control rights, agency cost will not equal to zero. Agents do not always perform according to the maximum interests of principals. Under the established incentive and constraint mechanism, managers will adopt some kinds of behaviors that are more or less not in accordance with the interests of shareholders.Perks are dominant residual losses. According to the theory of managerial power, managers have motives to seek rents by using their power, to increase perks in except of inf luencing their monetary compensation. Under the circumstances of compensation regulation in state-owned enterprises and relatively lower level of managerial ability, maybe the phenomenon of consuming perks by using power is more common. In recent years, news reports on business entertainment of listed companies have raised serious concern publicly.With the mechanism of reputation, managers with strong ability do not self-stimulate themselves by perks, and they will cherish their professional career so as to get competitive compensation in the job market of professional managers. In this paper, taking Shanghai and Shenzhen main board listed companies from 2010 to 2012 as sample, we have studied the impacts of managerial ability and power on perks. The study shows that managerial ability and perks are significantly negatively correlated, and the stronger the ability the managers own, the less private benefits they will grab by perks;the managers will have access to higher level of perks as with their power increases which implies that managers have incentive to grab private benefits when their power increases; in the private listed companies, the management with strong ability are more likely to constrain the increasing of perquisite consumption resulted from the power. It helps constrain abused perks to improve the internal governance and performance evaluation mechanisms, exert distinction effect of the competitive market of internal agents and the external manager market, and play supervisory role of the news media.