摘要
提出了一种基于Moran过程的接入网络选择方法,将选择策略的演化过程描述为有限个体间的群体博弈,并证明了每个群体策略演化是一个随机生灭过程.在此基础上,从多策略角度改进了局部更新机制,以揭示选择策略的演化机理.仿真实验结果表明,该方法能在有限演化次数内收敛到纳什均衡解,同时能避免无限群体博弈模型所产生的"乒乓效应".
A new approach for multiple wireless networks access selection based on finite Moran process, namely access selection based on finite Moran process (ASFMP) , was proposed, in which the process of selection strategy is described as a finite population game model, and each strategy evolution is proved to be a random birth-death process. The local update mechanism is then improved from a multi-strategy per- spective, which is used to reveal the revolution mechanism of selection strategies. Simulation shows that the proposed method can convergence to Nash equilibrium within finite evolution times, and can also a- void the "Ping-Pong effect" caused by infinite population game.
出处
《北京邮电大学学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第4期10-14,共5页
Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(61370212)
教育部博士点基金优先发展领域项目(20122304130002)
黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(ZD 201102
F201037)
中央高校基本科研业务费(HEUCFZ1213
HEUCF100601)
黑龙江省博士后基金项目(LBH-210204)