我国政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长的影响研究——基于省际面板数据的实证分析

A Research on the Impact of Intergovernmental Vertical Tax Competition on Tax Growth in China——An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data

从1994年分税制改革开始,我国在维持经济快速增长的同时,也呈现着税收超经济增长的现象。为了研究政府间纵向税收竞争程度对税收增长的影响,本文使用我国30个省区市1994—2010年的省际面板数据,采用税收分权指标与规范性指标描述我国政府间纵向税收竞争程度,借助面板单位根检验方法构建静态面板数据模型,并利用模型变量的偏系数展开分析。结果表明,在控制了经济增长与价格水平变动的情况下,我国政府间纵向税收竞争对税收增长存在正向影响,并且这种影响程度取决于纵向税收竞争的程度高低。因此,本文提出了调整中央地方财力与事权划分、加强地方主体税种建设、优化政府间转移支付制度、完善税收与财政支出立法体系等政策建议。

Since the Tax-share Reform implemented in 1994, China has experienced the over-growth of tax revenue along with the rapid economic growth. In order to study the impact of intergovemmental vertical tax competition on tax growth, this paper, using the provincial panel data of China from 1994 to 2010, introduces the tax decentralization index and the constraint index into the description of the degree of intergovernmental vertical tax competition in China. Supported by the method of panel unit root test, a static panel data model is specified and the partial coefficients of model variables are employed into the analysis. The results clearly demonstrate that under the control of economic growth and price index, intergovernmental vertical tax competition exerts a positive influence upon tax growth. Additionally, the extent of the impact rests with the level of vertical tax competition. Based on these, this paper puts forward some policy suggestion, such as adjusting the division of powers in revenue and ex- penditure between the central and local government, strengthening the construction of local tax, optimizing the intergovemmental transfer payment system, perfecting the legislation system of the standardization in tax revenue and fiscal expenditure, and so forth. Generally speaking, intergovernmental vertical tax competition refers to the tax competition specific to the same tax base between upper and lower level governments. This study mainly focuses on the behavior of the vertical tax competition in a narrow definition, namely the behavior between central and local governments. Tax growth refers to the growth of total tax revenue which does not exclude the price influence. Since the implementation of the Tax-share Reform in 1994, the central government reversed the financial condition and centralized most fiscal revenue and tax power, strengthening the capability of macroeconomic control. This kind of rearrangement, however, was still on the basis of the original intergovernmental expenditure responsibilities, and led directly the fact that local governments were trapped in less tax sources and fiscal difficulties. Therefore, the dominant power of the central government in fiscal revenue, tax power and systematic management, and the strategic response of the local government facing with the central pressure, together shape the situation of intergovernmental vertical tax competition. Undeniably, this situation brings about many problems, for instance, vicious horizontal tax competition, the irrational behavior of local officials, and the weakening of macroeconomic regulation and control in the central government. Now, it has been a significant part to establish a scientific pattern of vertical tax competition in China so as to standardize the competition behavior. Firstly, the division of the supply of public goods between the central and local government should be rearranged. On the basis of the clear division principles on government expenditure, the authority power in different government levels should be rationalized, which will advance the supply efficiency in public goods. Moreover, certain tax legislative power should be endowed to local governments. Relevant rules and regulation should hereto be set and implemented. Meanwhile, main types of tax should be elaborately selected. The retail tax should be selected as the main provincial tax, with the property tax as the main county tax. The environment tax, resource tax and income tax, at the same time, should be set as the subsidiary taxes in the local tax system. Furthermore, the system of intergovernmental transfer payment should be optimized. The implementation pattern should be adjusted and internal structure should be innovated to relieve the fiscal pressure in local governments.