中国上市公司企业家激励约束机制与企业业绩关系再研究——国有控股与非国有控股公司的比较视角

The Mechanism of Entrepreneur's Incentive and Restriction of Chinese Listed Companies:Comparing the State-Owned with the Non-Stated-Owned Listed Companies

本文基于权力经济学、契约理论和代理理论,以2004—2012年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,对比研究了中国国有控股与非国有控股上市公司的企业家激励与约束机制特征。研究表明,企业家的显性契约激励,即企业家薪酬,与企业业绩呈显著正向关系,并且其显性契约激励与隐性契约激励(即在职消费)是互补的;企业家隐性契约激励、组织资源等会显著影响企业业绩与企业家显性契约激励的作用关系,但不受企业性质的影响;而国有控股上市公司企业家的隐性契约激励明显高于非国有控股上市公司。这些研究结果丰富了权力经济学在企业研究中的应用,且拓展了企业家激励约束机制以及企业性质的相关研究。

This study is based on the power economics, contract theory and agency theory. The contracts can be divided into explicit contracts and implicit contracts. The explicit contracts are formally signed between corporate stakeholders in order to meet the basic material needs of stakeholders and to reduce the transaction costs between stakeholders. The implicit contracts are the derivatives of the explicit contracts, also known as derivative contracts or surplus contracts, which are not truly signed among corporate stakeholders, but binding on each party. According to the power economics, the owners of different resources obtain different potential powers which build up the power structure. In the power structure, the entrepreneurs are generally stronger than ordinary senior managers. The improvement of corporate performance will bring entrepreneurs more explicit contracts and the occupation of implicit contracts, which also stimulates them to improve corporate performance. This paper studies on the mechanism of entrepreneur＇ s incentive and restriction of Chinese state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises of A-share listed companies, taking 9494 observations of 2004 to 2012 as the sampies. This research shows that besides the remuneration incentive, for entrepreneurs the reputation incentive also plays an important role in the mechanism of entrepreneur＇ s incentive. Entrepreneurs hope to show their abilities through the growth and development of the enterprise for high praise and psychological satisfaction. The larger size of the enterprises, better growth, more free cash flow and less debt show the stronger organizational resources of enterprises. The sense of accomplishment and satisfaction of entrepreneurs will be more intense and entrepreneurs will obtain more incentives of implicit contract. The better enterprise configuration of organizational resources will bring more corporate performance. The allocation of corporate performance is determined by the mechanism of incentives and the effect of allocation. The explicit contract will be increase in accordance with the improvement of corporate performance ,which will inspire entrepreneurs to create more implicit contracts. The on-the-job consumption in the implicit contract as a privilege,to some extent, can make up for the lack of explicit contractual incentives. Due to the Chinese state-owned listed company management facing lower monetary compensation, the on-the-job consumption has become an important component of management compensation. Therefore, the on-the-job consumption of the state-owned listed companies is more than the non-stateowned listed companies＇. In the power structure, the more explicit contract of entrepreneurs than the ordinary senior managers＇ indicates the power of entrepreneurs is greater so that entrepreneurs can take advantage of the power to occupy more implicit contracts, which will encourage entrepreneurs to improve corporate performance and create more implicit contracts. Therefore, the monetary compensation has a complementary relationship with the on-the-job consumption for corporate performance. Above the conclusion,this paper proposes the following policy recommendations： （ 1 ） to accelerate the establishment of a fully competitive market of entrepreneurs, making the selection of entrepreneurs in the state-owned companies divorced from the administrative ranks and be fully market-oriented; （2） to establish a scientific evaluation system of corporate performance of the state-owned companies so that the monetary compensation of entrepreneurs in the state-owned companies will be linked to the corporate performance; （3） to promote the legalization process of entrepreneur＇ s incentive and clearly defined the incentives and assessment measures of entrepreneurs＇ monetary compensation in the relevant laws.