政府审计对预算违规的作用:抑制还是诱导?——基于中央部门预算执行审计数据的实证研究

What are the Effects of Government Audit on Violations of Budget Discourage of Encourage? Based on the Research on the Central Department Budget Implementation Audit Data

预算执行审计本来是抑制预算机会主义行为的一种制度安排,如果制度安排不当,则可能诱导预算机会主义行为。理论分析表明,政府审计对于公共部门预算违规究竟发挥抑制作用还是诱导,是由预算违规的审计发现率、审计处理率和审计处罚率共同决定的,审计处罚率是关键变量,预算单位是否违规是根据政府审计机关的审计发现率、审计处理率和审计处罚率来做出策略性选择。根据中央部门预算执行审计的数据分析表明,预算执行审计不是抑制了预算违规,而是诱导了预算违规,产生这个结果的主要原因是审计处罚没有力度。

Budget Execution Auditing is designed to discourage the opportunism of budgeting. However, if it is arranged inap- propriately, it may encourage manners of budgeting opportunism. According to the theoretical study, the effects of government auditing on violation of budgeting are decided by a combination of discovery rate, treatment rate and penalty rate in budget ex- ecution auditing. Among these rates, penalty rate is the key variable. Pubhc sectors make their strategic decisions of budget violation based on these three rates. After analyzing the data of budget execution auditing, we found that budget execution au- diting actually encouraged the violations of budget instead of its being discouraged, because the threatening power of penalty is not enough.