摘要
主要从代理理论视角研究国际多角化的动机以及企业所面临的代理成本,探讨家族企业与非家族企业在全球金融危机时期的国际多角化绩效。研究表明:家族企业的利益一致效果大于权力巩固效果则家族企业国际多角化绩效比非家族企业好;反之,若家族企业的权力巩固效果大于利益一致效果,则非家族企业国际多角化绩效比家族企业好。研究结果还显示:在家庭企业的利益一致效果大于权力巩固效果的背景下,无论金融稳定期或是金融危机期,家族企业的国际多角化绩效皆比非家族企业佳,故家族企业仍然为一种较有效率的组织型态。
This study investigates how family firms and nonfamily firms achieve the international diversification-performance during the global financial crisis. We use agency theory to explore the motivation of international diversification and the impact of firm's agency problem on international diversification-performance. If family firm's alignment effect dominates entrenchment effect, family firm's international diversification-performance will be better than nonfamily firm. On the contrary, if a family firm's entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect, a nonfamily firm's international diversification-performance will be better than family firm. The empirical results show family firms outperform non-family firms during the financial crisis period and financial stability period, under the background of the effect of family interprise benefit consistency is greater than that of power consolidation. Therefore, family firm is still a more efficient organization.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第6期83-93,共11页
Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词
家族企业
金融危机
国际多角化经营绩效
代理理论
股权结构
企业价值
次贷危机
公司绩效
family firms
financial crisis
international diversification operational performance
agency theory
equity struc- ture
enterprise value
subprime mortgage crisis
company performance