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台湾家族企业国际多角化经营绩效研究——基于金融危机前后的对比分析 被引量:2

The Impact of Financial Crisis on Taiwan Family Firms:from the Perspective of International Diversification-Performance
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摘要 主要从代理理论视角研究国际多角化的动机以及企业所面临的代理成本,探讨家族企业与非家族企业在全球金融危机时期的国际多角化绩效。研究表明:家族企业的利益一致效果大于权力巩固效果则家族企业国际多角化绩效比非家族企业好;反之,若家族企业的权力巩固效果大于利益一致效果,则非家族企业国际多角化绩效比家族企业好。研究结果还显示:在家庭企业的利益一致效果大于权力巩固效果的背景下,无论金融稳定期或是金融危机期,家族企业的国际多角化绩效皆比非家族企业佳,故家族企业仍然为一种较有效率的组织型态。 This study investigates how family firms and nonfamily firms achieve the international diversification-performance during the global financial crisis. We use agency theory to explore the motivation of international diversification and the impact of firm's agency problem on international diversification-performance. If family firm's alignment effect dominates entrenchment effect, family firm's international diversification-performance will be better than nonfamily firm. On the contrary, if a family firm's entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect, a nonfamily firm's international diversification-performance will be better than family firm. The empirical results show family firms outperform non-family firms during the financial crisis period and financial stability period, under the background of the effect of family interprise benefit consistency is greater than that of power consolidation. Therefore, family firm is still a more efficient organization.
出处 《审计与经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第6期83-93,共11页 Journal of Audit & Economics
关键词 家族企业 金融危机 国际多角化经营绩效 代理理论 股权结构 企业价值 次贷危机 公司绩效 family firms financial crisis international diversification operational performance agency theory equity struc- ture enterprise value subprime mortgage crisis company performance
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