媒体在银行风险治理中的角色:中国的逻辑

The Role of Media in Bank Risk Governance:Based on Logic of China

基于我国银行部门的特殊制度背景,本文应用媒体治理理论考察媒体在我国银行风险治理中的角色,研究发现,在政府对媒体和银行存在双重控制的情况下,媒体监督在银行风险治理中遭遇了严重的困境。具体而言,在政绩诉求的驱动下,地方政府需要利用银行信贷资源维持投资驱动模式下的GDP增长,从而扭曲了信贷资源配置效率。所以,当银行的风险越大时,地方政府或银行自身越可能调动或游说媒体加强对银行的正面宣传,以吸引更多的社会资金,使其投资驱动的地方经济增长模式得以维持;并且,在金融市场化程度低、政绩诉求高以及银行是国有属性的情况下,这种现象更为明显。本文既能为我国银行改善风险治理提供政策参考,又能丰富我们对媒体治理的理解。

Based on the unique institutional background of China＇ s banking sector, this paper investigates the role of media in the bank risk governance of China with the theory of media governance. This study finds that when the media and the bank have been both controlled by the government, the government or bank will intervene and affect the independence of media, which will severely weaken the monitoring role of media in bank risk governance. Specifically, with the investment-driven economic mode, the political achievement demands of local government make them reply on the banks＇ credit resources to keep the GDP growth, which has distorted the efficiency of credit resources allocation. As a result, when the bank confronts more risk, to attract more social capital and maintain the local economic growth with the investment-driven economic mode, the local government or bank will more inclined to arouse the media to expand reports about the local commercial banks. And this is more obvious when the financial liberalization is less developed, the political achievement demands are stronger, or the bank is state-owned. This study can provide policy reference value on improving bank risk governance, and helps us to a better understand about media governance.