医生何时诱导患者需求——基于信任商品视角的研究与实验检验

When will the Physicians Induce the Patient's Demand——A Study and Experimental Test Based on the Viewpoint of Credence Goods

以我国医疗市场为现实背景,着重考察在患者不具有知识背景即不拥有鉴别能力的前提下,声誉与竞争等市场机制本身是否可以消除以及如何消除信任商品市场中的败德行为;在相关理论与假设的基础上构建了一个不完全信息下的无穷期博弈模型,对医疗信任商品市场中存在的过度治疗现象进行了分析;通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证,即医生之间的竞争与信誉能使得医生在均衡中诚实推荐治疗方案。

Taking China＇s medical market as the realistic background, this paper focuses on investigating that whether and how the competition mechanism, reputation mechanism and other market mechanism themselves can eliminate corruptions behaviors under the precondition of that the patients have no knowledge background and identifying ability;builds a dynamic incomplete game model in an infinite horizon to analyze the overtreatment in medical market from viewport of credence goods; and through the simulation experiment on the model, further verifies the results of the model,that is to say the competition among physicians and the reputation can make the physicians recommend the treatment protocols honestly.