兼任高管与公司价值:来自中国的经验证据

Affiliated Management and Firm Value: Evidence from China

本文实证检验了上市公司高管直接为第一大股东或实际控制人,或其同时也在第一大股东或实际控制人处任职时(即‘兼任高管’)与公司价值的相关性。通过分析中国A股上市公司2001年至2009年的数据,本文发现存在兼任高管的上市公司,公司价值显著较低。进一步研究显示,尽管存在兼任高管的公司,总资产收益率和销售利润率显著更高,但同时从事了规模更大、频率更高的与担保相关的关联交易,并且发生信息披露违规的可能性也更高。这些结果意味着,尽管兼任高管可以加强控股股东对公司的控制,但在新兴市场中,这种行为方便了大股东侵占中小股东利益,最终与公司价值显著负相关。

We provide evidence on how the presence of a top manager who is a controlling shareholderor the employee of a controlling shareholder( i. e. affiliated management) is associated with firm value. By analysing the data of Chinese listed firms in the A- share stock market from 2001 to 2009,we find that affiliated management is negatively associated with firm value. Furthermore,although firms with affiliated management have higher return on assets and return on sales,affiliated management is positively associated with the value and the frequency of loan- based related party transactions and with the likelihood of irregularity in information disclosure. Our findings imply that even if affiliated management may enhance shareholders' ability to monitor managers and increase the operational profitability,affiliated management can facilitate the expropriation of the interests of the minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders.