政府研发补贴方式对战略性新兴产业创新的影响机制研究

Research on the Influencing Mechanism of Modes of Distribution of Government R&D Subsidy on the Innovation of Strategic Emerging Industries

本文研究了政府研发补贴的不同发放方式对战略性新兴产业创新产生的不同影响机制。动态博弈模型分析指出,定额补贴由于不影响战略性新兴产业先行厂商的产品质量决策,所以在促进原始创新方面,它不如比率补贴有效。本文使用系统GMM方法估计了2009~2013年我国战略性新兴产业上市公司的动态面板数据,发现上市公司接受的定额研发补贴对其创新产出,即技术进步没有显著影响;这些上市公司上期的技术进步和当期研发投入会正向显著增加其创新产出。我国各级政府需要改变普遍使用的定额研发补贴方式,以比率研发补贴来代替定额研发补贴,从而提高战略性新兴产业的创新产出。

This paper studies different influencing mechanism of different distribution modes of government R＆D subsidy on the innovation of strategic emerging industry. The analysis of dynamic game model states, because the set-quota subsidy does not influence the product quality decision of the leading firm in the strategic emerging industry, it is not as effective as the ratio subsidy in improving the original innovation. This paper also uses the Sys-GMM method to estimate the dynamic panel data of Chinese listed companies in the strategic emerging industries from 2009 to 2013 ,and finds the set-quota R＆D subsidy accepted by Chinese listed companies in the strategic emerging industries does not affect the outcome of innovation which is measured by technological progress significantly. The technology progress in the previous one period and current R＆D input of these listed companies improve the current innovation outcome positively and significantly. The Chinese governments in the different levels need to change the popular mode of set-quota subsidy, use the mode of ratio subsidy instead of the mode of set- quota subsidy and it can increase the innovation outcome of the strategic emerging industries.