高管权力、股权激励行权价格与市场反应

Managerial Power,Equity Incentive Exercise Price and the Market Reaction

利用2006—2012年间公告股权激励预案的上市公司作为研究样本,分析高管权力对股票期权初始行权价格的影响及产生的市场反应。研究发现:高管权力过大会导致高管人员的自利性行为,高管权力越大则股权的初始行权价格制定得越低;股权激励预案宣告会产生显著为正的市场反应,且行权价格与市场反应显著正相关,即行权价格设定高的公司市场反应越积极,投资者能够通过股权激励方案识别高管的自利行为。

The article used companies which have announled equity incentive plans between 2006-2012 as samples,and analyzed the impacts of managerial power on stock option initial exercise price and the market reaction. The study finds that managerial power over the general assembly leads to self-serving behavior of managers;lower initial exercise price with the greater managerial power comes. The declaration of equity incentive plan will cause significantly positive market reaction,and exercise price has a significantly positive correlation with market reaction. The higher the exercise price is set,the more actively the company＇s market reacts. Investors can identify managers,self-serving behavior through equity incentive programs.