制度缺失的理性行动:PX事件中政府与民众博弈的“内卷化”现象

Rational Action Under Institutional Deficiency:A Study of the Phenomenon of Involution During the Game Between the Government and the Public in PX Incidents

日益增多的PX环保事件显示出"内卷化"趋势,民众强硬地"邻避"或索要高价,政府则机会主义地宣布停建或缓建,使国民经济中必需的PX项目无节制地流产。这是一种政府与民众理性行动却由于制度缺失而导致非理性的结果。本文以近年来发生于厦门、大连、宁波、昆明的四次PX事件为例,从博弈论与政策过程的角度,解释了政府与民众的理性行动及其导致的零和博弈窘境,并指出了通过制度设计与重复学习走出零和博弈怪圈的出路。

The ever growing PX environmental protection movements have showed a trend of involution. On the one hand, the public held an idea of NIMBY（not-in-my-back-yard） toughly or charged exorbitant prices; on the other hand, the government announced the suspension or the deferral of PX projects in an opportunistic way. These led to the intemperate abortion of PX projects which were necessary in national economy. In fact, under the circumstance of institutional deficiency, although both the government and the public acted rationally, the ending could just be irrational. Based on the four PX incidents happened in Xiamen, Dalian, Ningbo and Kunming in recent years, the rational action of the government and the public and the zero-sum game quandary resulted from this action were explained from the perspective of game theory and the policy process. Besides, the solution to the zero-sum game from system design and repeated learning were pointed out.