摘要
关于术语"看到"在知觉理论中的基本意义,塞拉斯阐述了现象主义的两条思路。一条思路是直接实在论,认为是"看到表面";另一条思路是古典现象主义,认为是"看到感觉内容"。塞拉斯经过细致地考察,指出这两条思路存在同一语词使用错误、相关陈述之间推断错误之类的问题。他解析了约翰的故事,断言"看到"的意义在于归属给相应的经验一个断言,而且认可了它。塞拉斯的观点既揭示了认识其不可缺少的规范性维度,也消除了认识会失去世界的忧虑。
On the basic meaning of the term "seeing" in the theory of perception, Sellars formulates the two lines of thoughts from phenomenalism. One is the direct realism thinking of it as "seeing a surface" ; and the other, classic phenomenalism, "seeing a sense content". By a careful examihation, Sellars has noted that there are several problems about those two lines, like the misuses of the same word and the incorrect inferences among relevant state- ments. He makes an analysis of a story about John, and claims that the meaning of "seeing" consists in the ascribing of an assertion to the corresponding experience and the endorsement of it. Not only does the point Sellars has made reveal the indispensable dimension of normativity for knowing, but also re- moves the anxiety for the knowing without the world.
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期103-107,共5页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature