非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究

Research on the Design of Incentive Mechanism for Enterprises' Energy Saving and Emission Reduction by Government Under Asymmetric Information

综合考虑经济增长与节能减排的双重任务,将消费者购买行为、节能减排努力准入标准、政府监督信号考虑在内,构建了政府与企业之间的多任务委托‐代理模型。分别探讨了对称信息和非对称信息下政府如何设计有效的激励机制,鼓励和引导企业积极进行节能减排。结果表明:节能减排努力市场准入标准越高,政府应给与企业越多的固定补贴;政府应根据观测到的企业不同节能减排努力水平设计激励机制;政府监督对促进企业节能减排具有重要作用。

Considering the dual tasks of economic increasing and energy saving, consumers＇ purchasing behavior, energy conservation standards on market access,and government supervision signal,we established a multi-task principal- agent model between the government and enterprises. In our paper, we mainly discussed that how to design an effective incentive mechanism for government to encourage and guide the enterprises to save energy and reduce emission under symmetry information and asymmetry information. Results indicate that the higher the market access standards is, the more fixed subsidy the government should give to the enterprises; Government should arrange different incentive mechanisms according to the observing efforts of enterprises; Government supervision can play an important role in regulating the enterprises in energy conservation and emission reduction.