基于产品差异化和规制条件下的斯坦克尔伯格模型研究

A Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Differentiation and Regulation

本文研究了产品差异化和规制条件下的斯坦克尔伯格模型,认为跟随企业的定价受主导企业定价的影响,但其定价受主导企业定价的影响的敏感程度随行业内跟随企业数量增加而下降。此外,本文还研究了在完全信息和不对称信息条件下政府对主导企业进行不对称规制时,为实现社会福利最大化对其征税的最优税率的确定。

The paper studies the stackelberg model of product differentiation and regulation conditions of the policy maker. It finds that the follower firm＇s policy is positively related to the dominant firm＇s price, their sensitivity to the dominant firm＇s price decreases as the number of firms grows. Under both complete and asymmetric information, the optimal tariff for the dominant firm is computed for the achieving of the maximization of social welfare.