国有企业改革中权力寻租行为分析及其防治

Analysis and Prevention of the Power Rent-seeking Action in the Reform of State-owned Enterprises

当前,国有企业权力寻租在行为主体、覆盖范围和寻租手段上,显露出一些新特点。究其原因,主要是因为"一把手"权大位重,为权力寻租留下空间;管理体制不完善,给权力寻租留下可乘之机;惩罚力度疲软,降低了寻租行为的风险成本。防治国有企业改革中权力寻租行为应从几方面着手,即注重宣传教育,增强"免疫力",自戴"紧箍咒",使领导干部不想腐;注重制度建设,架起"高压线",筑牢"防火墙",使领导干部不能腐;注重监督查处,设置"警报器",亮起"红灯区",使领导干部不敢腐。

At present,power rent-seeking in state-owned enterprises shows some new characteristics,especially on the subject, coverage and means. The reason is that ＆quot;head＆quot; is powerful,leaving space;Management system is imperfect,leaving chink;Weak penalties reduce the risking cost. Prevention and treatment include the following four aspects. That is,to pay attention to education in order to enhance ＆quot;immunity＆quot; and wear magic formula to make the leaders unwilling to corruption;to pay attention to the system construction in order to set up the high tension line and build a ＆quot;firewall＆quot; to make the leaders unable to corruption;to pay attention to supervision and investigation in order to set up the＆quot;alarm＆quot;and light up＆quot;the red light district＆quot;to make the leaders dare not corrupt.