风险规避销售商促销下基于收益共享契约的协调模型

Coordination of the Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer Exerting Promotional Effort via Revenue Sharing Contracts

在CVaR风险度量准则下,考察了销售商风险规避且其促销努力影响市场需求下收益共享契约的协调和谈判问题。研究指出,无论销售商的风险规避程度如何,通过引入成本分担机制,总存在某个收益共享契约能完成渠道协调。讨论了改进后的收益共享契约和收益共享的寄售契约的适用条件。运用纳什谈判解考察了收益共享契约及利益分配的谈判问题,得到:供应商和销售商的期望收益只与相对谈判能力有关,而与销售商的风险规避程度无关;但销售商的CVaR随其风险规避程度的增大而减小。最后,提供了一个数值算例以验证文中结论。

This paper investigates the coordination of supply chains with a risk-averse retailer and sales effort effect, using revenue sharing contracts （RSCs） and based on CVaR risk measure criterion. It discusses the bargaining problem in RSCs, and shows that there always exists a RSC, by introducing cost- sharing, which can coordinate the supply chains no matter what degree the retailer＇s risk aversion is. Furthermore, applicable conditions are presented for improved RSCs and consignment contracts w revenue sharing. Finally, it examines the issues on RSC bargaining as well as profit allocation, by Nas bargaining solution, and concludes that profit of a channel member, which risk aversion degree, is proportional to its own bargaining power. However h h is independent of the retailer＇s , the retailer＇s CVaR decreases temonstrate the conclusions.