政策演进中的农民工“退保”逆潮——基于新制度经济学的分析

The Opposite Tide of Migrant Workers' Surrender in the Policy Evolution:Based on an Analysis of New Institutional Economics

"民工潮"现象是改革开放以来中国社会的独特景观。伴随着大量农民工涌入城市,为之建立相应养老保险制度的呼声日益高涨并引起了政策层面的持续关注。然而,在配套制度不断细化完善的同时,却出现与政策推进相悖的农民工"退保"逆潮,甚至出现参保率不及退保率的怪相。以新制度经济学的制度变迁理论和公共选择理论为切入点进行分析,发现制度缺失与利益博弈是农民工群体大规模退保的主要原因。结合现有实际,认为应从法制健全、政策统筹、宣传普及等多方着力,全面构筑农民工养老保障的"安全网"。

The tide of migrant workers is an unique phenomenon in the Chinese society .With a large number of migrant workers into the city ,calls for building corresponding endowment insurance system for migrant workers are growing ,which also cause the attention of the policy level .However ,in the supporting system of a perfect and continuous refinement , there still appears migrant workers’ surrender phenomenon contrary to the policy ,and the insurance‐participating rate is even lower than the surrender rate .Using the institutional evolution and public choice theories of the New Institutional Economics as the starting point for analysis ,we found that the lack of system and the interest game are the main reasons for the masses of migrant workers’ surrender .Through the analysis of specific causes , and in combination with the actual practice ,we should improve the legal system and plan policies and also expand publicity .Only in this way can we build a pension security system for migrant workers .