考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析被引量：5

Research on the Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auction with Advertiser Reputation——Equilibrium,Revenue and Efficiency Analysis

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摘要搜索关键字拍卖机制的逐利本质诱发了大量的虚假广告,引发了公众的广泛争议,信誉已成为搜索媒体改进其拍卖机制必须考虑的关键因素之一。通过在关键字GSP拍卖模型中引入广告主信誉因素,提出了一种可信竞价排名的GSP拍卖机制,与传统拍卖机制相比,能有效提高中标广告主的信誉水平,通过对广告主均衡竞价策略、均衡收益与效率的分析表明,在广告主信誉差别较大时,该机制在增进搜索引擎收益和拍卖效率方面也有一定的优势;最后通过研究均衡的实现路径和模拟实验,在不完全信息动态环境下也验证了这一结论。 Profit-driven of keyword auction mechanism induces huge amounts of network fraud informa- tion, which greatly damages the interests of users. Through analyzing the optimum equilibrium bidding strategies and comparing with GSP auction mechanism which is widely used, found the ranking rule con- sidering reputation is more conducive than the simple rule of competitive ranking to improve advertising auction＇s profit and efficiency, when the difference between credibility of advertisers is large. Further, through analyzing the quilibrium realization path and numerical simulation, the conclusion is also verified under a dynamic circumstance.

作者殷红

机构地区华东师范大学商学院

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第11期54-61,共8页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

基金国家社科基金资助项目(10CGL014) 武汉科技大学冶金工业过程湖北省重点实验室开放课题资助项目(B201004)

关键词付费搜索拍卖 GSP机制 VCG均衡拍卖效率 sponsored search auction GSP mechanism VCG equilibrium advertiser reputation auctionefficiency

分类号 F224.33 [经济管理—国民经济]

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