发电企业竞价上网博弈模型及其算法研究

Power generation companies bidding model and its algorithm Game

假设所有发电企业通过密封报价这种形式来上网竞价,并在发电企业共同见证及同一时刻开标,且规定报价最低者将会被选为中标方,设计两个发电企业竞价上网的基于静态贝叶斯理论的博弈模型以及算法,当参与的发电企业均应用线性策略时,对模型所对应的收敛性进行了分析,同时对贝叶斯纳什均衡解是否存在进行了讨论;接下来对两个发电企业竞价上网模型予以相应扩展,分析了若干个发电企业竞价条件下的贝叶斯纳什均衡及相关问题,与此同时,构建了一个包含若干发电企业在内的共同竞价上网博弈模型;最后借助计算机系统予以仿真实验,得到的结论是:在电力竞价上网的博弈模型中,随着企业数量的不断增加,各自报价将会更加理性,并不断趋于预测值。

Assuming that all power companies quoted on the tariff to be sealed, and at the same time opening, the lowest bidder for the winning side, the design of the two power companies bidding game model and algorithm based on Bayesian theory of static power generation when participating when companies are using linear strategy, the corresponding convergence model is analyzed, while the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium are discussed; then be extended to the corresponding two power companies bidding model to analyze the number of Bayesian Nash equilibrium problem next generation companies bidding conditions and construct the corresponding number of power generation companies bidding game model; finally be the use of computer systems simulation, the conclusion is： the power game bidding model, with the increasing number of companies, each quote will be more rational, and continue to tend the predicted value.