不完全信息下的最优反倾销税率政策分析

Analysis of the Optimal Antidumping Duty Policy under Incomplete Information

笔者通过拓展Katrak的贸易政策分析模型,引入反映通货膨胀的贴现因子1,从而构建了外国垄断企业与进口国政府之间的多期信号博弈,对在完全和不完全成本信息下的政府最优反倾销税率政策分别进行了分析,得出在完全成本信息下,最优反倾销税率与外国企业成本成反比,与通货膨胀(贴现因子)无关。而在不完全成本信息下,当通货膨胀大时,不同成本类型的企业分别按各自的最优产量出口,此时歧视性反倾销税率政策较优;当通货膨胀小时,无论企业的成本类型是高成本还是低成本,它将以同样的产量出口,歧视性反倾销税率政策将不能保证国家福利最大化,此时单一税率政策更优。

Through expanding Katrak's model of commercial policy and introducing the inflation expectation—the discount factor,we analyzed the governmental optimal antidumping duty rate policy under the complete and incomplete cost's information by constructing the multi-period signaling game between foreign monopolist and the government of importing country. We conclude that the optimal antidumping duty rate has nothing to do with the inflation expectation—the discount factor and is in inverse proportion of foreign manufacturer's cost in the complete cost information. While in the incomplete cost information,the manufacturer will export in optimal quantity reflects its real cost type when the inflation expectation is high,the discriminate antidumping duty rate policy will be better in this condition. When the inflation expectation is low,then the manufacturer will export the same quantity whether it's cost is high or not,the discriminatory antidumping duty rate policy can't secure the maximization of national welfare,then the uniform duty rate policy will be better.