“主体性”、“自由”与“理性”:笛卡尔道德哲学形态的建构逻辑

Subjectivity, Freedom, and Reason:The Constructive Logic of Descartes' Moral Philosophy

国内学术界对笛卡尔哲学近代出场意义的过分关注乃至标签化势必影响对其道德哲学理论的研究。文艺复兴和宗教改革逐步建立起来的"自由原则"、"理性原则"和"主体性原则"为近代哲学的出场奠立了坚实的精神哲学基础。笛卡尔"我思故我在"的第一哲学原则决定其道德哲学形态建构的"主体性"、"自由"和"理性主义"逻辑。在主体理性形而上学基础上,笛卡尔道德哲学形态展现为三维结构:"精神实体"—"道德自由"—"‘我思’主体性"。"自我意识"和"自由意志"是构成"‘我思’主体性"内在结构的两个核心要素。"道德自由"蕴含着主体意志在理性原则基础上对善的主动选择。主体意志的决定根据——"道德本体"源自于主体"我思"这一"精神实体",而非超验的"上帝实体",一切未经"我思"的"道德本体"(法则)都是虚妄的。笛卡尔道德哲学研究的难点在于对其文本的处理,其道德哲学思想零星地散落在诸多文本之中,这可能是其道德哲学为国内学术界所忽略的重要原因。

Although Descartes’ philosophy has received attention in the Chinese academic circles, scholars have focused too much on the significance of its modern appearance, and have oversimplified his philosophy as a whole. This explains why Descartes’ moral philosophy has been under-studied in China. The present essay argues that Descartes’ First Philosophy also lays the metaphysical foundation for his moral philosophy; in other words, subjectivity, freedom, and rationalism together determine the constructive logic of latter. For Descartes,“moral freedom” is the freedom the ego has in actively choosing the good according to its innate rational principles, namely, principles originating from inside the ego, rather than from the transcendental entity, God. Moral laws are illusory and false if they are not founded on the innate rational principles furnished by the ego itself. Given that Descartes expresses his moral ideas rather loosely in various texts, this makes the study of his moral philosophy difficult, and this also partly explains why his moral philosophy has been under-studied in the Chinese academic circles.