基于博弈论的校企合作违约惩罚必要性探讨

On the Necessity of Breach Penalty in School-enterprise Cooperation from the Perspective of Game Theory

基于斗鸡博弈研究了校企合作中双方的决策行为,找到了纯粹决策和混合决策的纳什均衡。通过实例,对比计算了有无惩罚时,校企合作中混合决策的纳什均衡点的差异性:当采用一定力度的惩罚时,纳什均衡的点将离原点更远,双方将以更大的概率选择合作。因此,采用一定力度的惩罚措施对推进校企双方按照"合作"路线开展业务非常必要。为防范校企合作违约风险提供了参考策略。

Based on the theory of Chicken Game,the author studied the decision-making behavior of the parties of school-enterprise cooperation,and found the pure and mixed Nash equilibrium. The difference of Nash equilibrium point of mixed decision was calculated and contrasted by the examples on the basis of Chicken Game with some punishment or not. The results of comparison showed that Nash equilibrium point would go far more than the original point under some punishment. Then,both school and enterprise should choose the cooperation with greater probability. So,it is necessary to put forward a certain strength punishment to promote the participants＇ business according to their cooperation. It provided reference for the participants of school-enterprise cooperation to prevent the breach of contract.