摘要
通过操纵最后通牒博弈任务中的提议者方案类型的设计,探索了在连续重复的博弈任务中提议者印象对回应者决策行为的影响,结果表明:(1)在与同一提议者完成的多轮最后通牒博弈任务中,回应者会自发地对提议者印象进行调控,提议者印象影响了回应者的决策思考过程;(2)提议方案影响回应者的决策结果,在过度受益与过度受损两种不公平方案下,回应者的决策行为相反;(3)最后通牒博弈任务中表现出的公平是一种策略性公平,而非真正信念水平的公平。
The Ultimatum Game （UG）has been a typical experimental task through which to investigate social preference. In order to test if the impression of proposer, as an important aspect of the social exchange context, can keep stable and change responders＇ decisions in a UG. A modified version of UG was adopted, in which three types of proposer（ selfish, fair - minded, and generous） were set. The results showed that （a） responders＇ decision process were different due to impression of proposer, and indicated an impression shifting process, （b） responders＇ decision results were influenced mainly by the type of offers, （c）There might be strategic fairness or more complicated principle under what proposers make decisions in UG.
出处
《心理学探新》
CSSCI
2014年第6期554-559,共6页
Psychological Exploration
基金
国家自然科学基金(70671084)
四川师范大学博士启动重点项目
关键词
最后通牒博弈
印象调控
公平偏好
自利偏好
回应者
ultimatum game
impression shift
fairness preference
self - interest preference
responder
