主板市场退市制度与上市公司质量——基于政府目标分离视角的动态博弈分析

Delisting System and Quality of Listed Companies in the Main Board Market—Dynamic Game Analysis Based on the Perspective of Government's Separate Targets

文章基于证监会与地方政府目标分离以及证监会长(短)期目标分离视角,建立动态博弈模型,分析退市制度与上市公司质量关系。结果表明:证监会以短期市场波动最小为目标,维持既有不太严格的退市制度是最优策略,但对地方政府和投机者产生不当激励;以提高上市公司整体质量、增进投资者保护为目标,制订更为严格的退市制度是最优策略,不当激励消失,但在劣质股票数量较多情况下市场波动急剧降低;改革新股发行制度,可消除不当激励,制订更为严格的退市制度退居次优策略,市场波动稳步降低、上市公司整体质量逐步提高;数值模拟结果验证了上述结论。最后,提出加快新股发行制度改革和实施短期宽松、长期严格的分阶段推进的退市制度等政策建议。

Based on the perspective of separate targets between China Securities Regulatory Commission（CSRC）and local governments as well as short-term and long-term of CSRC,the paper builds a dynamic game model toanalyze the relationship between the delisting system and quality of listed companies. The results show that： First-ly, the optimal strategy of CSRC is to maintain the existing loose delisting system when its objective is to mini-mize short-term market volatility,which generates undue incentives for local governments and speculators. Second-ly,the optimal strategy of CSRC is to evolve more stringent delisting system when its objective is to improve theoverall quality of listed companies and enhance investor protection,and undue incentives disappear. However,thisstrategy can dramatically reduce market volatility when the market has a large number of poor quality stocks. Third-ly,CSRC could reform IPO system,which can eliminate undue incentives,transform more stringent delisting sys-tem into the suboptimal strategy, steadily decreases market volatility and gradually improve the overall quality oflisted companies. The numerical simulation results validate the above conclusions. Finally, the paper puts forwardpolicy recommendations on accelerating the IPO reform and implementing multi-stage delisting rules which areshort-term loose and long-term severe.