摘要
论文提出了理解弗雷格专名涵义的一种新的角度:路径观点。这一观点比较吻合弗雷格所坚持的涵义概念的若干特征,解决了弗雷格名称理论的许多极具争议的问题,如间接涵义、涵义的本体论,涵义是否有无限多层次。对照克里普克的名称理论及其逻辑背景,论文分析了克里普克及戴维森等人对弗雷格涵义理论的批评,从路径的观点较好地回应了这些批评。
The paper understands the sense of a proper name from a new perspective of the path view. This view accords with the characteristics of the notion of Fregean sense and solves many disputable puzzles on the theory of names, such as indirect sense, the ontology of sense, the infinite hierarchies of sense and so on. Against the background Kripke’s theory of names and his modal logic, the paper analyzes the differences between the two theories of names and uses the path view to answer the criticism from Kripke and Davidson.
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2014年第4期69-86,共18页
Studies in Logic
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"经典逻辑与非经典逻辑的哲学基础研究"(13BZX064)
国家社会科学基金重大项目"认知科学对当代哲学的挑战"(11GZD187)