归类性属性与个体的识别

Sortal Property and Identification of Individuals

克里普克提出了个体本质的"起源"学说,并以此为基础论证了关于"专名无含义"的基本观点。若依可及关系对"必然性"分层并遵守逻辑必然性的要求,这一理论可以得到证成。但关于个体的识别,这一理论无能为力,而吉奇的"归类性属性"概念恰可为此提供启发。如果没有"类"的概念,将无法完成对个体存在的识别以及对其本质的"思想实验"式的追问与回溯,因而从认识论角度看,一旦专名进入实际使用之中,必定会被赋予特定含义。

The origin theory of individual essence was proposed by Saul Kripke and it was acted as the on-tological basis to argue the rigidity theory of“proper names have no sense”. If we differentiate levels of“neces-sity”according to accessibility and comply with requirements of logical necessity, we can prove the rigidity the-ory. But this theory has nothing to do with the identification of individuals, in contrast, the notion of sortal prop-erty which was proposed by Geach can provide inspiration. If there is no notion of sort, we have no solutions to identify the existence of individuals and make thought experiments to explore its essence. Therefore, in the epis-temology, if proper names are used in linguistic practices, they will be given specific sense.