危机管理中企业应该第一时间进行信息披露吗?——基于中国上市公司116起危机事件的实证研究

Should Companies Disclose Related Information at the First Time in Crisis Management?——An Empirical Study based on Chinese listed Firms' 116 Crisis Events

信息披露与沟通是危机管理的核心内容,故而危机管理又称为危机沟通管理。然而,至于如何进行有效的危机信息披露与沟通管理,人们却知之甚少。鉴于此,本文利用中国A股上市公司在2007年1月1日至2013年9月30日期间发生的116起危机事件为研究样本,从投资者的市场反应视角实证分析了涉事公司信息披露的及时性和详细情况,以及危机应对措施等微观因素对危机事件管理效果的影响。结果发现,涉事公司越早向投资者披露危机事件信息,投资者的负向市场反应越弱,并且这种减轻效果随着危机事件的严重程度增加而增强。此外,涉事公司披露危机事件的经济利益损害信息和启动危机应急预案,会加剧投资者的负向市场反应。这些研究结论表明,面对危机事件企业应该在第一时间进行信息披露,以满足投资者的信息需求,从而更好地把握危机沟通管理中的主动权。

In the West, crisis management is also called as crisis communication management, which fully indi- cates the importance of information disclosure and communication with stakeholders in crisis management. However, in the context of China, firms usually choose to hide crisis information or even to deny the existence of crisis at the first time when facing a crisis event. In recent years, the fact that many Chinese coal mining enterprises tried to conceal production safety accident incidents is a typical example. Then, we wonder that whether the traditional method of Chinese enterprises in dealing with crises is the best crisis management practice. In other words, when facing a crisis event, should focal firms disclose crisis information at the first time or try to delay information disclosure？ Yet, so far we know little about how to effectively conduct crisis information disclosure and crisis communication management. In particular, extant literature in crisis management has long focused on the strategic framework level in China. Few studies,if any, have examined whether and how micro processing strategy （ e. g. , disclose detailed economic damage information, announce response plan） may affect the outcome of crisis management. Therefore, this study aims to fill up these research gaps. Using a data set of 116 crisis events happening in Chinese A-share listed companies trom 01/01/2007 to 09/ 30/2013 ,this study empirically explores the roles of several micro factors （e. g. ,timeliness of information disclo- sure, details of information disclosure, response plan） on the effect of crisis management, as measured by short-term market reaction of investors ,i. e. ,cumulative abnormal return （CAR）. We find that investors significantly and neg- atively react to information disclosure announcement of crises. More important, we find that there is a significant and positive relationship between the timeliness of crisis information disclosure and CAR, and this relationship is found to be stronger in severer crises. This finding suggests that the timeliness of crisis information disclosure is able to help target firms achieve a better effect of crisis management, and the severity of crises would strengthen the impor- tance of the timeliness of crisis information disclosure. Moreover, contrary to our predictions, to disclose detailed in- formation about economic loss and start a response plan would exacerbate investors＇ negative market reaction to the crises. We argue that this contrary finding is largely resulted from adverse selection behaviors of small and mediumsized investors in China＇ s capital market with underdeveloped information environment. That is, in China, external small and medium-sized investors tend to regard the announcement of response plan as a signal for the severity of crisis event rather than taking it as a good crisis processing practice. Our findings provide several practical implications. First, firms involving crises should respond and disclose cri- sis information at the first time when facing crises, for the sake of meeting outside investors＇ information demand and thus taking the initiative in the practice of crisis communication management. Second, from the short-term per- spective, the China securities regulatory commission and other related regulators should further standardize the infor- mation disclosure procedure of crisis events and perfect the compiling method and announcement program of crisis response plan for listed companies, and compress and reduce the free space and discretion power of listed companies in the crisis information disclosure as far as possible, in order to prevent endless speculation and subsequent ineffi- cient investment behaviors exerted by extemal investors when facing non-standard information disclosure and thus a- void distorting the optimal allocation of scarce capital. Finally, from the long-term perspective, regulators should im- prove the system of information disclosure and corresponding punishment mechanisms for listed companies, thereby effectively solving several long-standing serious information disclosure problems such as information hiding, information processing, inadequate information disclosure, untimely information disclosure, formal informal disclosure without substantive content, among others, so as to induce external investors to better understand and use the information disclosure of listed companies to make rational investment decisions. Only the well match between information sup- ply and demand can ultimately solve adverse selection problems like ＂Bad money drives out good＂ between investors and listed companies. In particular, since IPO registration system reform has recently been initiated by the CSRC, how to strengthen the supervision of information disclosure has become increasingly important.