摘要
不同类型的语句在产生信念之谜的可能性上存在差异,这可以支持分析语句或分析命题存在这一论点。为达到这个理论目的所采用的论证策略是这样的:第一步,根据所定义的主观翻译原则与客观翻译原则,考虑各种不同的实义词,从日常对象到人工物语词,到像单身汉这样的语词,含有所有这些语词的语句都有产生信念之谜的可能性。然后,考虑按通常的标准被认为是综合的或分析的语句,发现仅仅从分析语句还不能构造克里普克的信念之谜。第二步,论证在分析与综合区分不存在与不同语句产生信念之谜之可能性上的本质差异不存在之间有一种类似蕴涵的关系。因为已经证明分析语句与综合语句在产生信念之谜的可能性上有实质差异,故可以推出分析性的存在性。
Various types of sentences,when they lead to puzzle about belief,are different,this fact supporting the thesis that analytical sentence or proposition exists.To reach the aim of theory,argument adopted is as such:first,according to the subjective and objective translating principles,consider notional words of variety,from ordinary objects to artificial words and even words such as bachelor and it is possible for the sentences including these words to produce the puzzle.Consider the normally synthetical and analytical sentences and find that with mere analytical sentence Kripke's puzzle will not be constituted.Secondly,argue that between,on one hand,non-distinction between analysis and synthesis,and,on the other hand,no essential distinction among the possibilities of various sentences to produce puzzle about belief,is there relationship like implication.Since demonstrated that there is substantial difference among the possibilities of analytical and synthetical sentences to producing this puzzle,it resulted in existence of analyticity.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期30-39,160,共10页
World Philosophy
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“非存在对象的名字与新梅农主义研究”(项目编号:12JJD720010)
国家社会科学基金重点项目“分析哲学若干基本理论问题新探”(项目编号:12AZD072)阶段性成果