摘要
早在海德堡学派和图根特哈特之前,传统自身意识理论的基本主题就在胡塞尔现象学中得到专门而细致的关注。胡塞尔借助于对"原意识"和"反思"的区分,在两个不同的维度上探究了传统自身意识的核心问题。通过对原意识和反思之间奠基关系的厘清,胡塞尔现象学发展了一种新型的、不同于图根特哈特语义学进路的自身意识理论的"反思模式",它既有效避免了传统理论的循环困境,同时也没有窄化传统理论的问题域。
Husserl had paid a special and particular attention on the essential theme of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology,much earlier than Heidelberg School and Tugendhat did.By the distinction of 'primal consciousness' and 'reflection',Husserl explores the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions.Through the clarification of the founding relation of primal consciousness and reflection,the phenomenology of Husserl developes a new 'reflection mode' of the theory of self-consciousness,different from the semantic approach of Tugendhat,which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of the traditional theory.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期72-84,160-161,共13页
World Philosophy
基金
2012年度国家社科基金青年项目(项目编号:12CZX047)的阶段性成果