基于Stackelberg模型的应收账款融资决策优化

Accounts receivable financing decision optimization based on Stackelberg model

应收账款模式是供应链的主要融资模式之一,基于已有供应商、核心企业和银行3方合作的供应链框架,假定供应商违约率内生,且供应商、核心企业和银行3者符合斯塔克尔伯格(Stackelberg)博弈模型,引入银行的贷款价值比,建立供应商、核心企业和银行的决策模型.研究表明,银行存在最优贷款价值比,并给出其表达式,该比值与供应商自有资金、应收账款和产品批发价等因素相关;核心企业存在最优订货量和供应商最优产量,且两者相等;应收账款融资过程中,供应商以银行贷款价值比为上限,选择最优贷款价值比,并运用实例验证该决策优化模型.

Accounts receivable mode is one of the main financing models of supply chain. This paper,under the existed framework of supply chain tripartite cooperation among vendors,core enterprises and banks,assumes that the vendor＇s default rate is endogenous and the three parties meet the Stackelberg＇s game model. Then,it introduces the bank loan-to-value ratio to set up the three parties＇ decision model. Research shows that： firstly,the optimal loan-tovalue ratio of the bank is available and also the explicit expression is given. It is related to the vendor＇s own funds,accounts receivable and related products wholesale price; Secondly,the core enterprise＇s optimal order quantity and the vendor＇s optimal production output are available,and they are equal; Thirdly,using loan-to-value ratio from bank as the ceiling,vendors can choose an optimal loan-to-value ratio. The optimization model is proved by an empirical study.