声誉如何影响证券分析师的预测行为?

How does Reputation Influence Forecasting Behavior of Securities Analysts?——The Evidence from China

声誉被认为是抑制分析师机会主义行为的有效机制。本文选取2003-2012年分析师盈余预测和新财富最佳分析师榜单数据,采用倍差法研究明星分析师上榜前后预测特征变化。实证结果表明,虽然明星分析师上榜前的预测准确性和一贯性均优于非明星分析师,但是上榜后明星分析师的这两个特征却低于非明星分析师。研究结论说明我国的明星分析师上榜后研究质量下滑。本文对进一步完善最佳分析师评选机制提供了经验证据和理论启示。

Reputation is believed to be an effective mechanism to curb analyst opportunism. Using 2003-2012 analyst EPS forecasts and annual New Fortune Best Analyst lists, this paper adopts difference-in-difference method to examine forecasting pattern of star analysts before and after getting listed. The results show that star analysts exhibit higher accuracy and consistency than non-star counterparts before getting listed whereas the opposite is true after getting listed, which indicate that the research quality of star-analysts deteriorates in China. This study provides empirical evidence and theoretical implications for improving best analyst voting system in China.