董事会文化、高管权力与股权激励效果——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

Board Culture, Executive Power and Equity Incentive Effect——Empirical Evidence from State-Owned Listed Companies

以董事长领薪方式(通过上市公司抑或其控股股东发放)来刻画任人唯亲的董事会文化,考察了高管权力与股权激励效果之间的关系以及任人唯亲的董事会文化对这一关系的影响。研究发现,高管权力与股权激励效果正相关,但这一关系在董事长薪酬通过上市公司而不是其控股股东发放时会大幅削弱。研究结果的政策含义是,国企改革除了要放权让利、政企分开和股权激励以外,更要建立和倡导良好的董事会文化。

This paper illustrates cronyism of board culture by executive compensation(through the listed companies or their controlling shareholders), and explores the relationship between the executive power and equity incentive effect, and the impact of cronyism of board culture on this relationship. The finding is that a positive correlation exists between executive power and equity incentive effectiveness which will be greatly weakened when the directors are compensated through the listed firms instead of controlling shareholders. The policy implication of the result is that the reform of state- owned enterprises should build a healthy board culture in addition to the decentralization of power, the transfer of profits, the separation of government functions from enterprise management, and the equity incentive.