会计稳健性与银行借款契约——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Accounting Conservatism and Bank Loan Contract: Evidence from China

会计稳健性在银行借款契约中居于重要地位。借款人采用高水平的稳健性可以帮助银行降低风险,相应地,银行会提供一定的优惠作为回报。使用手工收集的2000-2007年中国A股上市公司的单笔银行贷款为研究数据,我们对上述问题进行了实证检验。结果发现,企业的会计稳健性越强,企业获得的每笔贷款金额越大,贷款期限越长,贷款的利率越低。另外,我们发现在法制环境越好,优惠政策越多,政府干预越少的地区,上述关系更为显著。

Accounting conservatism plays an important role in bank loan contracts. A high degree of accounting conservatism can reduce the risks faced by bank lenders,through reporting in a timely manner. Banks may then offer preferential policies to borrowers. This paper investigates this hypothesis,using hand- collected data on bank loans granted to Chinese A- share listed companies from 2000 to 2007. The empirical results show that companies with stronger conservatism tend to obtain larger loan amounts with lower interest rates and longer maturities. In addition,we find that the effect of accounting conservatism on bank loans is more significant in regions with better legal environments,more preferential policies,and less intervention from the local government.