中印边境互动:一种博弈视角的分析

Interstate Dynamics and Security Management on the Sino- India Border: A Game Theoretic Analysis

中印在边境地区的互动是一个动态博弈过程。表征相同或近似的边境情境实则蕴含着不同的策略均衡,即从"鹰—鸽"纯策略均衡到威慑下的"一报还一报"混合均衡,再回归到准协调机制下的纯策略相关均衡。中印边界博弈的"外溢效应"明显,并抑制了边境紧张或危机的扩散升级。中国和印度在边界认知上的巨大反差、互信赤字、国内政治影响决定了边界纠纷难以在可预期的中近期内妥善解决,武装共处下的和平并伴有可控的、低烈度的局部危机将是中印边境地区的常态。延展到全方位中印关系领域,非合作博弈下的竞争性合作将是双边关系的基本特征。

Interactions between China and India in their border region can be conceived of as a highly dynamic theoretical game. Seemingly identical or similar scenarios with respect to the border actually represent different strategic equilibria. These include a dove- hawk pure strategy equilibrium,a tit- for- tat mixed strategy equilibrium,and a coordination mechanism induced pure strategy relative equilibrium. A 'spillover effect'is clearly evident in the China- India border game,which serves to contain tensions or prevent a crisis from escalating. Collectively,the major contrast in understanding between China and India vis- à- vis the border situation,trust deficit and the impact of domestic politics make it extremely difficult for India and China to satisfactorily resolve the border dispute in the foreseeable future. With a militarized presence on both sides,peace can be managed,China- India relations will continue to be characterized by competitive cooperation within the context of a non- cooperative game.