摘要
文章以恒信德律评估珠海中富收购关联方B.P.I的少数股东权益为例,分析在非公平关联交易中资产评估机构的策略选择。通过分析大股东操纵关联方掏空上市公司或利益输送,应用博弈论研究评估机构针对大股东决策所采取的相关策略。在短期内,评估机构选择与大股东合谋,但证监会对于评估机构的抽查,会约束评估机构的合谋行为。因此,证监会加大对评估机构抽查力度,加强对评估机构违法行为的处罚,是规范评估机构在关联交易中定价行为的关键。
This paper selects Heng Xindelv assessed the value of minority equity of B.P.I in affiliate transaction as a case, and analyses the strategy choices of appraisal firm in affiliate transaction. The thesis researches large shareholder manipulates affiliation to tunnel the listed company or transfer benefits, uses analysis of game theory to research the assessment firm' s strategy choice about large shareholder' s decision. In a short term, the assessment would conspire with large shareholder. However, the commission would conduct random checks appraisal firm' s illegal acts and punish it. Therefore, the commission should strengthen spot check and punishment for the assessment illegal behavior, it is the key that specification of appraise I firm' s act which prices the target goods in the affiliation legally.
出处
《安徽行政学院学报》
2014年第6期44-47,共4页
Journal of Anhui Academy of Governance
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL049)
教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(11YJA630113)
关键词
关联交易
资产评估
博弈论
策略选择
affiliate transaction
asset appraisal
Game Theory
strategy selection