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基于监管视角的中小投资者保护 被引量:1

Research on the Protection of Small and Medium Investors from the Perspective of Supervision
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摘要 我国中小投资者权益保护存在问题突出表现在信息不对称、投资者回报机制不健全、中小投资者权利意识淡薄、法执行力较弱等几个方面;监管机构也陷于执法手段有限、稽查执法人员不足、力量薄弱等困境。完善中小投资者保护一是要加快监管机构转型,加大执法力度,提高违法成本;二是要强化市场主体信息披露的法律责任,建立健全信用平台;三是要优化投资回报机制;四是健全投资者适当性机制,加强教育,提高风险意识;五是保障中小投资者行权与维权的便利性。 Some factors affect the protection of the rights of china' s small and medium investors, such as : asym- metric information, imperfective system of investors' return, weak risk sense to small and medium investors, and lower performance in law execution, etc. Meanwhile, the regulators find themselves in a tight corner because of limitation in law enforcement measures, shortage of law - executors, and weak power in law performance. There- fore, in order to improve the protection for small and medium investors, we should do as follows : firstly, the regu- lative agencies need to speed up transformation, enforce the law more strictly and make higher cost to law - break- ers. Secondly, the government should strengthen the legal responsibility of market subjects on disclosing informa- tion, establish and perfect the credit platform. Thirdly, the mechanism of investors' return should be optimized. Fourthly, the regulators should perfect an appropriate investment mechanism for investors; provide more invest- ment education for them, and strength investors' risk sense. Lastly, more convenience should be provided for small and medium investors to exercise or defend their rights.
作者 何福英
出处 《湖南工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2014年第6期44-48,共5页 Journal of Hunan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词 中小投资者 投资者保护 监管 small and medium investors protection for investors supervision
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