专利饱和与产业政策杠杆

Patent Saturation and Policy Leverage

专利饱和的实质是专利权空间的饱和,具体表现为两种形式,一是一定时期内,专利授权率没有出现剧烈波动,产业相关技术领域的授权专利的权利要求数逐年降低而授权专利数量却逐年增加;二是在一定时期内,专利审查标准没有出现重大改变而某一技术领域的专利授权率急剧下降。理论推导和产业实证模型验证了这一概念的合理性,实证结果表明,产业转型及诉讼应对可能导致2002—2007年美国无线通信、移动手机和软件及数据处理行业出现了专利饱和;入世后关税减让带来的进口贸易激增和专利法修改前相对新颖性带来的本土优势促使权利人大量申请我国专利,进而导致2001—2003年的发明授权饱和,而2008年后专利资助政策的连年升级是我国发明授权率急剧下降的一个可能原因,且资助政策对国外权利人的影响可能更为显著。

Patent saturation is the saturation of patent technological characteristics, which consists two different forms. Firstly, the patent grant rate was basically stable in the given period, the claims of patent grants declined but the number of patent grants increased year by year. Secondly, there are no significant changes in the examina-tion standard of patent grant in the given period but the patent grant rate showed an obvious decline. Theoretical derivation and empirical study of industrial convinced the rationality of the conception. Empirical results also show that, industrial restructuring and litigation responding were the two important possible factors contributed to the patent saturation of U.S. wireless communications, mobile phones, and software and data processing industry in 2002-2007. The concession of tariff and the comparative advantage due to the relative novelty rule promote the Chinese companies and foreign enterprises to applicant a large number of patent, which leading to patent satura-tion in 2001-2003. The patent subsidy policy after 2008 induced a sharp decline in the rate of licensing inven-tions, which is more obvious in the patent application of foreign rights holders.