基于预算硬约束的地方政府性债务治理

Local Government Debt Management Based on Hard Budget Constraints

地方政府性债务预算软约束归根结底是一个动态承诺问题,即中央事前不救助的承诺在事后往往不可行,从而引发地方机会主义行为的滋生和蔓延。近年来我国地方政府性债务快速增长、财政金融风险持续累积,既有城镇化的动因,也有预算软约束的诱因。硬化预算约束、治理地方债务,亟须在强化地方财力、推行阳光融资、清理平台债务上疏堵并行,在强化纵向行政约束和横向市场约束上综合施策。

Soft budget constraint for local government debt is ultimately an issue of dynamic commitment, which means that prior commitment made by the central government for no assistance tends to be lack of feasibility in the aftermath of incidents, thus giving rise to opportunistic behavior of local government. In recent years, China＇s local government debts have witnessed rapid growth, accompanied by accumulating fiscal and financial risks, resulting from both urbanization as the active factor and soft budget constraint as the hidden incentive. Hardening of budget constraints and improving governance of local debts require coordinated guidance and blockage in strengthening local financial resources, implementing ＂sun-shine＂ financing, and clearing platform debts. Relative policies should be implemented in a comprehensive manner which strengthens both the vertical administrative constraints and horizontal market constraints.