基于微分博弈的两级供应链质量控制机制设计

Study on Design of Quality Control Mechanism of Two-echelon Supply Chains Based on Differential Game

首先基于微分博弈方法构建了具有单个制造商和单个供应商的两级供应链的Nash非合作博弈模型与Stackelberg博弈模型,接着利用Pontryahin的极大值原理给出了两类博弈模型的均衡解和目标函数的最优值,最后通过对比两种情形下的博弈均衡结果阐明了在两级供应链上的质量管理过程中制造商作为供应链上质量控制领导者的Stackelberg主从博弈均衡策略严格优于非合作博弈Nash均衡策略。

In this paper, using the methodology of differential game, we established the Nash non-cooperative game model and Stackelberg game model of the two-echelon supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and single supplier, then based on Pontryahin’s maximum principle, presented the balanced solution of the two models and the optimal value of their objective functions, and at the end, through a comparison, demonstrated the superiority of the Stackelberg master-slave game model.