买方抗衡势力对上游企业质量创新的影响——基于零售商Stackelberg竞争的分析

Countervailing Power and Quality Innovation of the Manufacturer

通过构建一个三阶段的完全信息动态博弈模型,考察了零售商买方抗衡势力对上游制造商质量创新的影响,结果表明:当领导者零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,抗衡势力增强抑制了制造商的质量创新,进而导致市场均衡价格下降,均衡产量增加,而零售商销量呈非单调变化;此外,随着抗衡势力持续的增强,消费者福利水平先上升后下降,最后,文章证明了零售商批发价格在一定条件下存在"水床效应"。

We build a three stage dynamic game model to study the mechanism of the effect of countervailing pow -er on upstream quality innovation .The results show that , when the leader retailer has countervailing power , the enhancement of its countervailing power inhibits the incentives of the quality innovation of manufacturer , which reduces the market equilibrium price , and increases the output , while the retailers ’ sales change in non-monotonic curves .In addition , with the countervailing power enhanced , the consumer welfare increases at a certain stage and then decreases .Finally, the study proves that wholesale prices of retailers have “waterbed effect” under a certain condition .