自由的可能性问题：从康德到胡塞尔

The Problem of Possibility of Freedom:From Kant to Husserl

自由的可能性问题一直是康德伦理学研究中的一个重要问题。本文拟从这个问题与现象学的关联中揭示解决这一问题的可能方向。本文将试图证明,以自由可能性问题讨论现象学的方法获得了进一步的深入。首先,康德在其对这一问题的讨论中已经暗含了现象学的基本思考方法;其次,费希特的探索直接肯定了智性直观(本质直观)这一现象学的基本方法对问题思考的决定性作用;最后,胡塞尔在其对意志本源现象的分析中,便自由的可能性问题获得了更深入的理解。

The possibility of freedom is an important issue in the study of Kant's ethics.This paper reveals the possible direction to solve this problem by the association between this question and Phenomenology.In this paper,I will try to prove that the method of phenomenology gained further in-depth insights for discussion of this problem.First,Kant has implicit the basic way of thinking of phenomenology in his discussion of this issue;secondly,Fichte directly affirmed,that intellectual intuition(Wissenschau) as the basic method of this phenomenology play a decisive role to explore this question;and finally,Husserl gained a deeper understanding of the possibility of freedom in its analysis of the original phenomenon of the will.