社会信任、法律执行与股权制衡效果

Social Trust, Law Enforcement and Outside Block-holders Efficiency

非正式制度如何影响经济增长近年来受到学界与实务界的高度关注。考察社会信任对实体经济影响的具体机理及其后果,在社会信任普遍缺失的当下中国尤具重要价值。本文以2003~2012年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究作为非正式制度的社会信任对中国企业股权制衡效果的影响及深层原因。结果发现：较弱的股权制衡机制实际上是中小股东对控股股东给予一定程度信任的结果,在信任度较高的社会中,中小股东可减弱对股权制衡的内在需求;股权制衡的主要机制是信任能够缓解控股股东和中小股东之间代理冲突,减轻中小股东对控股股东道德风险的担忧;社会信任对股权制衡的作用效果,取决于企业所在地区的法律制度执行效率,并通过其对股权制衡的影响来提升企业绩效。

The correlation between informal institution and economic performance has constantly draw high attentions from both academia and professionals. In modem China, where lacks social trust, accessing the fundamental nature of the mechanism between social trust and real economy is considered critical and valuable. This paper attempts to reveal the direct effect of social trust to outside block-holders in Chinese corporates, and then the fundamental nature, by taking the performance from 2003- 2012 of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples. The result confirms the hypothesis that weaker counter-balance mechanism is the result of medium- or small-size shareholders granting a certain extent of trust. In other words, in societies with higher social trust, the demand of counter-balance mechanism is also lower. As the main nature of counter- balance mechanism is to ease the tension and distrust between shareholders with controlling rights and small- and medium- size shareholders, which also leads to a reduction of the moral-hazard risk. The effects of social trust on counter-balance depends on the area of the legal system of the law enforcement efficiency, and through its impact on counter-balance mechanism to improve enterprise performance.