众包竞赛模式下企业R&D创新水平策略博弈分析

The game analysis of enterprises' R&D innovation strategyunder crowdsourcing contest mode

企业R&D创新需要有效利用内外部创新资源,基于众包竞赛模式的企业R&D创新能够充分挖掘和激发大众的创新智慧,助力企业R&D创新,已受到企业界的广泛重视。考虑R&D创新模式溢出效应的不同情况下,针对企业创新模式及其投入策略选择,以及众包竞赛模式下企业间完全竞争和合作时的决策问题,建立了相应的博弈模型,分析了企业的决策对R&D创新水平的影响。研究表明:较仅依靠内部资源的R&D创新(A策略)收益,企业通过设置合理的奖金并结合内部创新和众包竞赛模式(B策略)是占优策略;B策略下,企业间处于完全竞争或合作的状态时,溢出效应的不同对众包竞赛模式创新能力的贡献度造成了影响;此外,企业收益、R&D创新水平、消费者剩余及社会福利均与众包竞赛模式的贡献度正相关。最后以宝洁公司采用B策略对R&D进行创新的案例验证了相关结论。

The enterprises' R&D innovation require effective use of internal and external resources.As a new mode of innovation,crowdsourcing contest has drawn a widely public attention due to its full use of the public's intelligence for enterprises' R&D innovation.Considering the existence of spillover effects,we developed a game model to analyze the optimal innovation mode and investment policy of enterprises.When crowdsourcing contest is selected,we further discussed the corresponding decisions if the relationship between enterprises is competitive or cooperative,and analyzed the influence of these decisions on R&D innovation.The results showed that,when a reasonable bonus was set,the strategy that combining use of internal innovation and crowdsourcing contest innovation(B strategy) was better than that solely relying on the internal innovation(A strategy).Given B strategy,different spillover effects would affect the level of R&D innovation of crowdsourcing contest mode,under both competition and cooperation situation.Meanwhile,the contribution of the crowdsourcing contest was positively related to many factors,including enterprise income,the level of R&D innovation,consumer surplus and social welfare.Finally,a case of P&G Company is used to verify the corresponding conclusions of the paper.