基于碳信息不对称的两级供应链谎报行为

Misreporting Based on Asymmetric Information of Carbon Emission and Carbon Price in a Two-echelon Supply Chain

为研究供应链上下游企业间面临碳信息不对称风险时的最优谎报决策,运用Stackelberg博弈理论探讨制造商为主导的二级供应链博弈行为。结合碳排放交易机制下的新型利润模型,采用逆向求解法求解供应链参与者最优决策,并定性分析制造商和零售商的谎报行为以及谎报行为对供应链绩效的影响。研究表明,碳信息谎报与成本信息不对称情形具有明显差异。制造商不论是否谎报碳信息均能最大化自身利润,而零售商将低报碳排量信息。相比零售商不谎报情形,谎报反而能提高制造商与零售商利润,但此时供应链总利润仍低于供应链最优利润。制造商可通过收益共享契约协调供应链,且最优收益共享系数与谎报情形下零售商利润正相关。

Under asymmetric carbon information between upstream and downstream enterprises, in order to study the optimal misreporting decision, the Stackelberg game theory is adopted to discuss a two-echelon supply chain led by a manufacturer. A new production model is established based on carbon emission trading mechanism, and the optimal operation decisions of supply chain participants are obtained through the converse solution method. Besides, both the manufacturer and the retailer＇ s misreporting behavior and their influences on supply chain performance are discussed by a qualitative analysis. The results imply that there are big differences between carbon information misreporting and cost misreporting in supply chain. Manufacturer could seek his maximum profit whether he misreports or not. Compared with reflecting carbon information honestly, retailer prefers to under-report carbon information, and the misreporting of the retail- er will increase both the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer. However, the supply chain profits in misreporting situation are still lower than the optimal supply chain profits. The manufacturer can coordinate the supply chain with revenue-sharing contract, and the optimal revenue-sharing coefficient has positive correlation with retailer＇ s profits in misreporting situation.